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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 45267
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2016-8083
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jeremiah Newell pled guilty to one count of robbery.  He
received a unified sentence of thirty years, with ten years fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Newell contends
that  this  sentence  represents  an  abuse  of  the  district  court’s  discretion,  as  it  is  excessive  given
any view of the facts.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On June 22, 2016, officers responded to a report that a man had entered multiple
residences.  (R., p.1; 6/16/17 Tr., p.22, Ls.16-18.)  The man, later identified as Jeremiah Newell,
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was pursued in his vehicle by law enforcement.  (6/16/17 Tr., p.22, Ls.17-19.)  He did not stop
when instructed to do so by law enforcement, and, after striking two police cars and a civilian in
her car, he abandoned the car and fled on foot.  (6/16/17 Tr., p.22, Ls.19-21; R., pp.13-14.)  He
knocked on the door of a home, and, while holding a pocketknife, told the homeowner to bring
him the keys to a pickup truck and hide his car in the garage.  (6/16/17 Tr., p.22, L.21–p.23, L.4;
R., pp.10-11; PSI, pp.730-731.)  He took the keys and drove away in their truck.  (R., p.11.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Newell was charged by information with one count of robbery
with a firearms sentencing enhancement, one count of aggravated assault on law enforcement,
one count of aggravated assault, one count of felony eluding, and one count of misdemeanor
eluding.1  (R., pp.98-100.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Newell pled guilty to one count of
robbery.  (5/19/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-16; p.17, Ls.18-21; R., pp.146-156.)  As a condition of the plea
agreement,  Mr.  Newell  agreed  to  pay  restitution  on  all  charged,  uncharged,  and  dismissed
conduct.  (5/19/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-20; R., p.155.)  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges.2  (5/19/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-20; R., p.148.)  The State agreed not to request
more than thirty years as its sentencing recommendation and to recommend the sentence be
concurrent with his other sentences.  (5/19/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-22; R., p.148.)  The cases were
consolidated for sentencing, and the parties agreed to use the PSI prepared in a 2016 Canyon
County case, CR-2016-11133-C.  (R., pp.155, 160; PSI, p.713.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Newell to a
unified sentence of thirty years, with twelve years fixed.  (6/16/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.14-17.)
1 Mr. Newell’s two cases, Ada County case number CR01-17-2336 and CRFE2016-8083 were
consolidated by the district court.  (R., pp.113-114.)  In CR01-17-2336, Mr. Newell was charged
by information with one count of aggravated assault.  (5/19/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.11-15.)
2 The plea agreement was a global resolution that resolved all of Mr. Newell’s pending cases.
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Mr. Newell’s counsel asked the district court to sentence him to fifteen years, with five years
fixed.  (6/16/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.4-5.)
 Mr. Newell was sentenced to thirty years, with ten years fixed.  (6/16/17 Tr., p.34, Ls.1-
8; R., pp.163-166.)  Mr. Newell filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.3
(R., pp.167-169.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of thirty years, with
ten years fixed, upon Mr. Newell following his plea of guilty to robbery?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Thirty Years,
With Ten Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Newell Following His Plea Of Guilty To Robbery
Mr. Newell asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of thirty years,
with ten years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
3 Mr. Newell also filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider the
sentence, but the district court denied Mr. Newell’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing because
Mr. Newell did not submit any new or additional information in support of his motion for
leniency.  (R., p.170; Augmentation, pp.1-3.)   Mr. Newell does not assert that the district court
erred in denying his Rule 35 motion as no new information was presented in support of the
motion for leniency, as required under State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
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573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Newell does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Newell must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id.  The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Newell’s sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Newell was only 32 years-old at the time of this incident, but he has long struggled
with  an  addiction  to  methamphetamine.   (Presentence  Investigation  Report  (hereinafter, PSI),
pp.714, 719, 754.)  Although Mr. Newell had been clean from methamphetamine for five years,
he relapsed in 2016 during a difficult time in his life, and subsequently committed several
offenses during his relapse.  (PSI, pp.719-720, 742; 6/16/17 Tr., p.28, L.19 – p.29, L.8.)
Mr. Newell was doing really well on probation, prior to the relapse.  (PSI, pp.734-735.)
The  Idaho  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  substance  abuse  should  be  considered  as  a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982).  In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested
alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91.  Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has
ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate the
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance.  State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981).  Mr. Newell wants to enroll in substance abuse treatment.  (PSI, p.741.)  He intends to
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seek help with his drug addiction so he can be a better man and be a good father to his daughter.
(R., p.743.)
Mr.  Newell  does  have  a  supportive  family  to  assist  him in  his  rehabilitation.   He  has  a
mother and father who are supportive of him, and want to help him when he is released from
incarceration.  (PSI, pp.734-735.)  Mr. Newell has a two year old daughter, with whom he enjoys
spending time.  (PSI, pp.735, 738.)  Mr. Newell was there with her every day before he and his
daughter’s mother broke up—he calls her a miracle because she has spina bifida and
hydrocephalus.  (PSI, p.738.)  Mr. Newell’s daughter is one of the most important people in his
life, and he wants to be a good father to her.  (PSI, p.743.)
Further, Mr. Newell expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions.
(6/16/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.13-18; PSI, p.743.)  At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Newell apologized for
his actions.  (6/16/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.13-15.)  He told the court:
I guess I would like to apologize to the courts and to the victims of my crimes.  I
made  some  very  poor  decisions,  and  I  have  some  true  remorse  for  what  I  have
done, and I take full responsibility for what I have done as well.
I would ask that you take a couple of things into consideration before sentencing
me.   I  was  out  on  parole  for  five  years,  and  I  did  really  well  out  there.   I  was
promoted to management in my job.  I had a good relationship with the mother of
my daughter.  We were together for that entire five years.
I had a daughter.  And when I relapsed on meth and I lost my job, everything just
spiraled  out  of  control,  and  I’m  just  ashamed  of  what  I  did  out  there.   It  was
ridiculous.  I should have put my daughter first.  And if there was any way that I
could go back and redo all of this, I know I would do everything a lot different.
(6/16/17 Tr., p.28, L.13 – p.29, L.8.)  Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a
defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. Shideler,
103 Idaho at 595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
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The issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has been
addressed in several cases.  For example, in Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition
of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character.”
Alberts, 124 Idaho at 209.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant’s term of imprisonment because
the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.  In Shideler,
the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his poor mental and
physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with
his  remorse  for  his  actions,  was  so  compelling  that  it  outweighed  the  gravity  of  the  crimes  of
armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime. Id. at 594-95.  Therefore, the Court reduced Shideler’s sentence from an
indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve
years. Id. at 593.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Newell asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.  He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse, family support, and substance abuse/addiction, it would have
imposed a less severe sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Newell respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2017.
___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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